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UNION SECURT IN WAR-TIME
By LuciLE LomEN
No appraisal of the present-day labor situation can be complete
without a discussion of union security, which is one of the most signifi-
cant trends in modem labor relations. The concept was formulated
before the war, but it owes its rapid development to the need for union
protection resulting from present abnormal conditions and its imme-
diate purpose is to preserve union morale. Even when considering
post-war economic and social policies, this device is important as a
basis for determining the position of unions in that era. If union
security is widely employed in post-war labor contracts, the device will
give unions a position of prominence never before held by any institu-
tion or organized group in American history. Whether the policy will
be continued voluntarily after the war will be determined by the
harmony of labor-employer relations during this period of governmental
supervision.
Over two years have passed since union security first received sup-
port from government agencies, and perhaps some fairly accurate con-
clusions can be drawn from a study of the evolution of this device under
the war program. It is the purpose of this paper to summarize the
policies of the National Defense Mediation Board and the War Labor
Board with respect to union security, with emphasis on the practical
aspects which may be helpful both in the promulgation of contracts and
in furnishing a background for future policy development.
"Union security" is a technical term used to refer to clauses in labor
contracts which provide protection to the union and insure its con-
tinued existence within a plant. Security varies in degree (according to
the justification and the need, if granted under the appropriate govern-
mental unit, or according to the bargaining power of union versus
employer, if the agreement is promulgated without the benefit of outside
assistance) from closed and union shop to mere expressions of pro-
union sentiment on the part of the employer." Union security demands
'The following are the generally accepted types of union security,
ranging from the highest to the lowest degree:
a. Closed shop: All employees must be union members at the time of
their hiring and must remain members in good standing during their
employment.
b. Union shop: Employer has no restrictions on whom he may hire, but
within a specified period of time after hiring, an employee must become a
union member, if he is not one, and he must remain a member in good
standing for the duration of his employment.
c. Preferential shop: Preference is given to union members in hiring,
laying-off, distribution of work and in promotions. The most common
form of this type of security is the preferential hiring clause.
d. Maintenance of membership: All employees who are union members
as of a certain specified date must remain members in good standing as a
condition of continued employment. New employees may be hired from
either union or non-union sources.
e. Check-off: The employer must periodically deduct a certain amount
of an employee's pay and give to the union the amount deducted as dues
or other obligations to the union. The agreement may provide that the
check-off will require the consent of the member and it may be revocable
or irrevocable according to the degree of security deemed appropriate.
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have become practically universal due principally to the unnatural
conditions of war-time and an evolutionary growth of labor legislation
during the 1930's.
War in Europe increased production demands within our own
country to the point where the unions were beset with problems of
organization fundamental to their continued predominance among the
working classes. The unions were greatly strengthened in membership,
but in spite of the fact that unions were in a stronger bargaining position
than ever before from the standpoint of size, they could not enforce
their demands with their most potent weapon-the strike-because of
the anti-strike sentiment engendered by the war and the need for
increased production to meet military demands. Traditionally, unions
have gained and held their members by promises of higher pay, shorter
hours and improved working conditions. The anti-inflation measures
curbed pay increases and military needs necessitated longer rather than
shorter hours so that the unions could not indulge in their usual
activities to increase their memberships. Thus, to satisfy their mem-
berships and to maintain their strength, it became essential for the
unions to have some form of security.'
Pre-war governmental machinery for the promotion of labor-em-
ployer relations was found solely in the Conciliation Service of the
Department of Labor. This service consisted of a group of trained
mediators who attempted to be on hand at the scene of any unrest and
to offer their services in mediating controversies which could not be
settled amicably between the primary parties. After the outbreak of
the European war, the need for production and hence the need for
increased protection against strikes brought about a large increase in
the personnel of the Service, but the Service could not insure 100 per
cent tranquility on the production line, as its policy was strictly one
of mediation. The agreements drawn up between employers and
employees were a compromise of the demands of each group rather than
an agreement drawn up by the third party to be adopted by the
opposing groups. Therefore, it is impossible to outline any public
policy with respect to union security because the security measures
granted, if any, under the Conciliation Service did not come from the
mediator but were a product of the discussions and compromises
between the parties themselves.
f. Employer encouragement of the union: There is great variety in the
provisions coming under this type of security, ranging from employer
recommendations that all employees join the union to mere statements by
the employer that he approves of the union.
g. Discipline of anti-union activity: Really this comes within the
employer-encouragement variety of security but is considered as a
separate type because it requires that the employer take active steps (i. e.,
discipline through discharge, lay-off, etc.) against any activity which im-
perils the position of the contracting union.
2 T. T. Hammond, The Closed Shop Issue in World War I1 (1934) 21 N.
C. L. REv. 127, 142.
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Though it is conceded that the Conciliation Service scored a high
degree of successes, the few strikes which it could not prevent were
considered by the war-minded public to be disastrous.3 With the threat
of strikes in the Ford Motor Company and the Bethlehem Steel works,
public temper rose to high pitch and anti-strike measures were intro-
duced into Congress. Then with the passage of the lend-lease bill in
March, 1941, necessitating even greater production, it was found that
the Conciliation Service alone was not sufficient to quell all labor
controversies.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
On March 19, 1941,4 the National Defense Mediation Board was
created to supplement, not to supplant, the Conciliation Service. This
Board was to use persuasion rather than compulsion, but by reason of
its published recommendations it had more force than the Service
could exert. Public opinion was not sympathetic to attempts of labor
unions to capitalize on war-time conditions for purposes of strengthen-
ing their own position, so when recommendations of the Board were
published, usually public pressure was sufficient to force conformity
from the party at fault. (Additional weight was given to the Board's
recommendations when three of the plants were occupied by military
forces for failure to comply.) In theory the fact that the Board could
not initiate cases but had to wait for certification was a great weakness,
but actually most cases of any great moment did come before this body.
The Board purportedly did not settle controversies according to fixed
policies, but some rather definite trends seem to be developed in its
decisions. Moreover, it is obvious that its decisions influenced the
character of the controversies which never came before it, as both
parties to a labor agreement drawn up after the Board had commenced
its operations would base demands and concessions according to what
they thought would be their fate should the Board have to act on their
case. Thus, a single opinion of the Board would establish a specific
pattern, from which it might be said that definite policies actually
were being outlined, and the dissolution of the National Defense Media-
tion Board is all that interrupted the procession of opinions which
appeared to be establishing law.
Generally, it might be said that the National Defense Mediation
Board definitely believed in union security. Of course, its work fre-
quently resulted simply in a restatement of points agreed upon by both
parties, which must be taken into account in evaluating its work. In
over 50 per cent of the cases before the Board, union security was in
8Until the beginning of 1941 the government was satisfied with the
cooperation of labor, and strikes, where they did occur, were not considered
serious. New York Times, March 8, 1941, p. 8. However, the public took
offense at any labor unrest.
AExsc. ORDER 8716, March 19, 1941; 6 FED. REG. 1532, March 21, 1941.
1944)
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issue.5 It was a policy not to depart from previous agreements, if any
existed between the parties,6 but union security, in some form, was
usually granted even where the previous agreement had provided none.
The Mediation Board opinions may be grouped generally according to
the degree of security provided.
All-union shop: Demand for an all-union shop was made in forty-
nine cases but was granted in only one-the Bethlehem Steel Company,
Shipbuilding Division case. It was granted in this instance only because
the Board felt that the Company's objection to a closed shop provision
should be given less weight than the fact that without such a provision
stabilization of the shipbuilding industry on the Pacific Coast would
be defeated. A master contract had been proposed for the shipbuilders
and the unions on the Pacific Coast which would insure uniformity
throughout that area for the duration of the emergency. The Bethle-
hem Company was the only one which refused to operate under the
all-regional contract, basing its objections on the fear that a closed-shop
provision in one of its branches would pave the way for the same
provision throughout its various plants." Later it was stated by a
member of the Board that the Bethlehem Company was averse to
accepting the agreement voluntarily because of the precedent, so that
it was a matter of policy to refuse compliance until a formal recom-
mendation of the Board should force them to accept the provision. 8
The extreme circumstances present in this case preclude an inference
that the Board in any way favored an extension of the all-union shop.
In most of the many cases in which the all-union shop was demanded,
the unions did not expect to receive this degree of security but they
started out with this demand in order to have bargaining power. The
process of arriving at a satisfactory agreement has some of the elements
of horse trading. Each side starts out boldly asking more than it
expects so that when the compromise is accomplished both have
obtained about what they expected to get. However, in the Captive
Mines case,9 the demand for an all-union shop was made in all serious-
ness. Maintenance of membership was offered and was rejected by
the union. But the Board denied the all-union shop on two grounds,
first, that the union was so strong that it did not need the all-union shop
provision. Judging by its rapidly increasing membership, the United
Mine Workers had the ability to complete the unionization of the
industry on a voluntary basis, which the Board deemed to be a
sounder approach to establishing an organization to withstand any
period of depression or future labor unrest. The second factor which
influenced the decision was that the granting of a union shop to the
Hammond, supra n. 2, p. 147.
6 Trails Blazed by Mediation Board, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 538, Jan. 19, 1942.
7 8 LAB. REL. REP. 614.
89 LAB. REL. R zP. 539, Jan. 19, 1942.
'Bituminous Coal Operators, NDM'B No. 20-B, Nov. 10, 1941.
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Captive Mines would give unions a monopoly of the coal mining
industry'" so that the workers would have to be union members or give
up coal mining in the United States. Strong repugnance was felt to a
government-created monopoly, but the Board saw no objection to the
same result obtained through voluntary negotiation.
Said John L. Lewis, during the course of the hearings, "If the board
(NDMB) refuses the miners a union shop, the Board is through!
The board chairman, Bill Davis, a fine patent lawyer, is through.""
His boast was not an idle one. The CIO members of the Board
resigned as a result of the recommendation in this instance, which
prevented consideration of more CIO cases. AFL cases were considered
by the remaining members, but the Board could not go on.'2 However,
the government, not to be thwarted by such labor antics, soon estab-
lished the War Labor Board, the policies of which will be discussed
infra in some detail.
Final settlement of the Captive Mines case was reached through
means of an arbitration board composed of John L. Lewis, president
of the union, Benjamin Fairless, president of United States Steel, and
John R. Steelman, who was on leave of absence from his position as
head of the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor for the
purpose of participating in this arbitration. The arbitrators granted a
union shop, to which Mr. Fairless dissented. The objection of the
Mediation Board to imposition of a monopoly by the government was
respected in form, but it is drawing a very technical distinction to deny
that the government participated when the head of the Conciliation
Service, even if on leave, cast the deciding vote.'3
It is impossible to establish a definite policy toward the all-union
shop as the conditions in the Bethlehem case and the Captive Mines
case were highly individualized and are not applicable in the general
run of cases. Placing emphasis where it did in denying union shop to
the miners, the Board left a way out should it decide to grant union
shop in other cases.
Maintenance of membership: Frequently this provision was substi-
tuted for the union shop clause demanded by the union.' 4 Though the
Board, because of its mediatory nature, did not desire to establish
precedents, it did find it necessary to give opinions which explained its
recommendations. Inevitably these opinions were used as bases for
similar recommendations when similar factual backgrounds were pre-
%1 Union shop conditions existed throughout the remainder of the coal
industry, whereas in the shipbuilding industry, in spite of the union shop
established on the Pacific Coast by the 'Bethlehem case, there still re-
mained non-union plants where builders could find work for which they
were trained.
"Will Davis of the War Labor Board, FoaRu.N, March, 1942, p. 70.
12 21 N. C. L. REv., supra n. 2, p. 163.38 Id. at 150.
1" Supra n. 6.
1944]
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sented to the Board. For this reason it is interesting to briefly examine
the cases in which membership-maintenance was granted by the
Mediation Board.
This type of security was given to the union involved in the North
American Aviation Company case'5 to improve union morale which
had been greatly weakened due to the vicious combination of wildcat
strikes followed by army occupation. The national officers of the
union exerted much pressure to prevent the strikes, but members of
the local paid no heed to protests and troops had to be moved in to the
plant. Maintenance of membership was granted on these facts to
facilitate the union's efforts to reestablished employee relations and to
provide a stable basis for union morale efforts.
Uncompromising employer opposition to a union was the basis of a
maintenance of membership award in one of the cases before the
Board. 6 This, together with the North American Aviation case,
indicated that the strength and soundness of the unions would be
protected from disturbing outside elements.
The Board extended its philosophy established by the previous cases
to grant a maintenance clause17 to a union which had for two years
been subject to a "no strike pledge," which detracted from the union's
ability to recruit new members through aggressive tactics. This pledge
was especially burdensome to the union because of the tremendous
increase in the number of workers in the industry. Furthermore, union
influence was weakened by reason of a master contract insuring to all
workers uniform conditions in the shipbuilding industry on the Atlantic
Coast.s The employer refused, despite the Board's recommendation,
to include the maintenance provision in its agreement, and so the union
again called out its workers, which forced President Roosevelt to
order the Navy Department to seize and operate the plant.'
Following this experience, the Board took a more conservative turn
as expressed in the Lincoln Mills case 20 in which it again recom-
mended a maintenance clause but qualified it with the addition of an
"escape clause." This was accepted by the employer after a two-
Ir North American Aviation, Inc., NDMB No. 36, May 22, 1941.
10 Western Cartridge Co., NDMVB No. 44, June 24, 1941.
1Federal Shipbuilding & Drybock Co., NDMB No. 46, June 30, 1941.
1821 N. C. L. REV., supra n. 2, p. 154.
'9 The plant was returned to its owner on January 6, 1942, and former
management was restored. Change in labor policy as exemplified by the
pledges against strikes and -lockouts in December, 1941, was largely re-
sponsible for the return of the plants. Secretary of Navy Knox stated, in
his announcement of the return, "As a result of the recent industry-labor
conference, there will be no war work stoppage anywhere and all disputes
will be resolved by peaceful means. Any unsettled issues between the
company and the union should be settled by negotiation and agreement;
if not, they can be resolved without interrupting production by recourse
to the machinery established by the President." (i.e., the War Labor
Board.) Return of Plants after Seizure, 9 LAB. EL. REP. 513, Jan. 12, 1942.2 Lincoln Mills of Alabama, NDMB No. 57, July 28, 1941; 9 LAB. RPr-
REP. 181, Oct. 20, 1941.
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months refusal. Withdrawal from the union was permitted for reasons
not relating to wages, hours or conditions of work, and it was provided
that the reasons given for withdrawal must be considered by a board
of review.
The other three cases in which the Board recommended union-main-
tenance clauses were insignificant for purposes of, analyzing the
development of a pattern inasmuch as the basis for the recommendation
in each case was very specific. The first was simply a trading of a
union shop demand for a maintenance of membership clause which
was agreeable to both parties, 21 the second- opinion merely incorporated
the clause as it had previously been agreed to in conferences between
the parties; 2 ' the third recommendation was made after capitulation
by the company in the face of panel unanimity.21
In six22 instances, the maintenance of membership clause was
included in contracts secured by agreement between the parties, under
auspices of the Board.' The clause underwent some modifications in the
course of these agreements. In the Air Associates &se it was accom-
panied by a "harmony and goodwill" clause which provided that the
company would advise all employees that an agreement existed between
the company and the union.22  Another variation of the provision was
that the company should "discipline" employees who failed to remain
union members in good standing, whereas the usual clause specifically
provided for discharge of the delinquent employee. Extra strength
was given to the clause in the Alabama B Products agreement requiring
that not only must present members remain in the union but new
employees had to join. However, the trend of relaxation2 4 was again
evident in the Hammond & Irving case, the last case disposed of by the
Board, which bound only those employees who signed a voluntary
pledge to remain members in good standing.25
Shop discipline and employer cooperation: It would seem a valid
conclusion that the foregoing examination of cases indicates a marked
reluctance on the part of the Board to fall prostrate before the demands
of labor. Always where security measures were granted there were
adequate evidences of the need of some protection to insure the
union's effective continuance. Further support for the conclusion that
the Board was attempting to meet the situation and to remain an
independently thinking body, free of labor domination, is drawn from
2121 N. C. L. REv. supra n. 2, p. 152.
22 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., NDMB No. 5, Apr. 1, 1941; Air Associates,
Inc., NDMB No. 51, July 17, 1941; Utica & Mohawk Cotton Mills, NDMBNo. 23, Apr. 30, 1941; American Cyanamid Company, NDMB No. 88, Oct.
7, 1941; Alabama By-Products Corp., NDMB No. 95, Oct. 20, 1941; Ham-
mond & Irving Co., NDMB No. 111, Dec. 15, 1941.
229 LAB. REL. REP. 517, Jan. 12, 1942.
'




the fact that the degrees of security granted varied so greatly.2 6 The
Board members felt it necessary to protect the unions, but they estab-
lished a wide range of security clauses so that no greater degree of
security was granted than the Board felt warranted by the circum-
stances of a case. To this end, several "luke-warm" clauses were
devised which served to appease the unions without demanding much
sacrifice of the employer's traditional freedom of conduct. These
measures took the form of shop rules imposing certain duties and
restrictions upon the companies.
An outstanding example of the "shop discipline" clause is that con-
tained in the agreement entered into between Allis-Chalmers
27 (Mil-
waukee) and the CIO union, which had gone out on strike to secure
protection against the AFL union trying to enter the company. The
company agreed to prevent AFL efforts to organize on company
property, to post a statement that the company favored members
remaining in good standing, and to discipline employees doing anything
to interrupt peaceful relations in the plant. An impartial arbitrator
was appointed to review the company's failure to take appropriate
disciplinary measures when necessary.28 The Ingall's Shipbuilding
case 2 was settled with the recommendation that the company make a
declaration of belief that the interests of its employees are best served
by membership in a union and that it discourage the existence in its
plants of any union but the Metal Trades Council. Some force was
put into this recommendation by the offer of the Board to have one of
its representatives investigate at the union's request to see that the
company lived up to the agreement.
Some companies preferred the positive approach of encouraging
union membership through publication or posting notices that "the
company has good will toward membership in the certified union as
a basic part of our industry and a vital partner in defense production,"
that it "looks with favor upon its employees becoming members of
the unions, parties to this agreement," or some similar expression
designed to allay any fear of discrimination against those who joined
the union.80
26 Chr. Davis expressed his philosophy thusly: "And the desire and
purpose of the Board, I might say its policy and principle in that regard,
is that the emergency should not be used either to build up or tear down
union .... I don't think a union ought to call a strike for the closed shop
just because they know that we are in a great emergency and the oppor-
tunity is better now for that reason. I don't think the company ought to
refuse any request from a union with respect to union security just be-
cause they think the men can't strike because of the public opinion that
would be aroused against it. . . . What is a fair union security agreement
is a matter to be negotiated between the parties, if possible, and it differs
very much in different cases." 9 LAB. REL. REv. 1, Sept. 1, 1941.2 7 Allis-Chalmers Manuf. Co., NDMB No. 6, Apr. 2, 1941.
21 For a summary of the arbitrator's opinions, see Rules on Union-Corn-
pany Relations, 9 LAB. RExL. REP. 300, No. 24, 1941.
"Ingall's Shipbuilding Corp., NDMB No. 92, Nov. 15, 1941.
Among the cases containing recommendations of encouragement of
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Preferential hiring clauses were sometimes coupled with these other
lesser forms of security, but this kind of clause, in the last analysis,
does not seem much more effective than a policy of endorsing unionism
as there are always opportunities to circumvent the general statement
embodying the policy.31
WAR LABOR BoARD
Only a month after the National Defense Mediation Board was
emasculated by the resignation of the CIO members, the United States
entered the war, making it imperative that some means be adopted to
assure absence of interruptions to an all-out production program. To
this end, the President called a meeting of labor and industry repre-
sentatives on December 17, 1941, to work out the principles upon
which to predicate the settlement of any labor problems which might
arise. After due deliberation, the conferees established three general
points of agreement: (1) that there should be no strikes or lockouts
for the duration; (2) that all disputes should be settled by peaceful
means; and (3) that the President should set up a War Labor Board
to handle disputes. In answer to the report presented to him by the
conference, President Roosevelt accepted the promise of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes and proceeded to establish a Board in accordance with
the third point of the agreement.
On January 12, 1942, the National War Labor Board was created
by Executive Order No. 9017.32 The Order gave the Board jurisdic-
tion to settle "labor disputes which might interrupt work which con-
tributes to the effective prosecution of the war."3 3 However, it was
expressly provided in the Order that the Board could not derogate
from the operation of then-existing labor laws, which provision the
union representatives had urged in their separate statement to the
President. The Order in now way limited the scope of authority to
hear disputes, which was tantamount to a presidential rejection of
the employers' recommendation 4 that the question of the status of
union membership requirements as expressed in existing contracts
should be subject to change only through voluntary agreements. This
point was the chief subject of disagreement between the employer and
employee representatives who had participated in the conference, but
the Executive Order was silent as to any policies which should be laid
union membership are' Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corp., NDMB No.
16, Apr. 8, 1941; Todd Galveston Drydocks, NDMB No. 62, Aug. 7, 1941;
Curtis Mann!. Co., NDMB No. 25, May 2, 1941; Ex-Cell-O Corp., NDIB
No. 29, May 8, 1941.31 "All things being equal and when practicable, members of the said
union will be given preference in the hiring of men when said members
have registered with- the employer's employment office and with the
union's and are available within twenty-four hours." Ingalls Shipbuilding
Corp, NDMB No. 92, Nov. 15, 1941.
82 'Comstitutioi', of War Labor Board, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 536, San. 19, 1942.
31 Id. at 538.
2id. at 537.
1944]
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down for this 'vital issue to insure domestic harmony. In fact, the
Board was left free to determine its own policies as regards an issue,
the only limitation being the one mentioned above.
During World War I, shop unionization had been frozen by agree-
ment 5 between the parties. This could serve as no precedent for
present policy consideration because of the radical change in labor's
position effected through legislation during the 1930's. To freeze
union status at this time would demand no concession on the
part of employers, but would appreciably weaken the unions' position
in the national economy. In 1918-1919, in return for their acceptance
of the "freeze" agreement, labor had been granted the right of collective
bargaining and the establishment of minimum wages. By 1941 labor
had secured both of these rights through federal legislation, and nothing
was promised them now should they submit to the program adopted
by the War Labor Board of earlier years. On the other hand, the
unions contended that in return for the "no strike pledge," given im-
mediately after the declaration of war, they should be given union
security.
Union security would, according to its proponents, make it possible
for unions to live up to their agreements because it would give them
control over their membership and insure effective collective bargain-
ing. Furthermore, security measures would eliminate the necessity for
the agitation of grievances and would promote cooperation between
employers and employed.86 But the industrialists contended that union
security measures, when secured through governmental compulsion,
were anti-American and contrary to fundamental democratic tenets.
This argument goes to the root of the problem and the answer to it
will be a major factor in determining post-war labor policies. Objec-
tion was not directed entirely toward union security itself, but repug-
nance to the measure was coupled with protests against its enforcement
by an administrative agency. If modern conditions require that pater-
nalistic concepts be adopted to greater extent than heretofore in our
government, then steps taken to activate paternalism should be chan-
neled through Congress rather than the executive branch of the govern-
ment.
The War Labor Board is composed on a tri-partite basis, with four
members each from the public, management and labor. It has power
351918's Labor Policies in 1941, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 185, Oct. 20, 1941.
""All our study and deliberation convinced us that a strong, re-
sponsible and properly operated union would aid production. When the
fear of anti-union activity is removed, -there is then a proper basis for
harmony and intelligent cooperation between union and management. An
attitude of mutual respect between labor and industry is the foundation
for a real participation in production by the worker. It should be realized
that the laborer has a stake in the company for which he works; if he
feels he is a part of it and not just the recipient of kingly largess he may
be expected to work more diligently and put more thought into his job."
Basic Doctrine of War Labor Board Decision, WAYNE L. MORSE, 11 LAa. REL.
REP. 88, Sept. 28. 1942.
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to determine its own jurisdiction and is authorized to act when the
Secretary of Labor certifies to it a dispute or, in the event of disputes
threatening essential defense production, it may take jurisdiction on its
own initiative. It has greater authority than the National Defense
Mediation Board in that it can compel arbitration and it can make a
final disposition of a case, from which there is no appeal provided
in the administrative hierarchy.3 7 Nor are War Labor Board decisions
reviewable by the courts, according to a recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia."8
At the outset, this Board was confronted with the question of union
security which had been the cause of dissolution of its predecessor and
it did not hestiate to take jurisdiction over this burning issue. The
first five cases to be adjusted by the War Labor Board, all by agree-
ment,. each contained a demand for union security (the demand
always was made for a closed shop or all-union shop provision) and
in four of the cases some degree of security was granted, while in the
fifth the security demand was waived in favpr of a wage increase.
However, the fact that the Board would take jurisdiction did not in
itself throw any light on the problem of the policy to be adopted
toward specific demands. This Board, as was the case with the Media-
tion Board, had been established without any prior determinations of
policy and with the expressed intention not to be bound by its own
decisions. Thus, a discussion of union security under the War Labor
Board seems inevitably to require the presentation of individual cases
in the effort to draw some generalizations from the treatment accorded
the various forms and degrees of union security.
All-union shop: It is in the field of the all-union shop demand
that the Board has laid down the most dearly defined and well-
established principles. The Order under which the Board was created
specifically stated that the Wagner Act must be adhered to, and under
the Wagner Act, the dosed shop is a proper object of bargaining. 9
3"New Labor Tribunal Open for Business, 9 LAB. REL. REe. 533, Jan.
19, 1942.
-1 In a suit to annul and enjoin a directive order of the NWLB, the
U. S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, ruled that "The Board's
order is not reviewable. . . . It is clear and undisputed that no statute
authorizes review of the War Labor Board's orders. ... The legislative
history of the War Labor Disputes Act implies a positive intention that
these orders should not be reviewed.... The question is whether general
equitable principles authorize review. We think they do not.... Any action
of the Board would be informatory and 'at most, advisory.' Appellants'
demand that we annul and enjoin the Board's order therefore amounts to
a demand that we prevent the Board from giving the President advice
which appellants contend would be erroneous. A court might as well be
asked to prevent the Secretary of State or the Attorney General from giv-
ing alleged erroneous advice. The correctness of administrative advice can-
not be reviewed by the courts. They have neither the necessary authority
nor the necessary qualifications for such work." Employers Group of
Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. War Labor Board, et al., U. S. Ct. of App.,
Dist. of Col. No. 8680, June 2, 1944 (14 LAB. EEL. REP. 456, June 12, 1944).
39 For an interesting discussion of the closed shop see Trend Toward the
Closed Shop, 9 LAB. REL. REm. 300, Nov. 24, 1941.
1944]
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On the assumption that unionism is desirable, one school of thought
holds that the closed shop is the only means of insuring its survival
and strengthening it to the point where the greatest benefits can be had
from the system. If the unions secure pay increases or other material
gains and non-union members "cash in" on equal footing with union
members, there is much discontent among the workers. This, plus the
natural urge to strengthen their own position, causes union leaders in
an open shop to expend much time in drumming up membership rather
than concentrating on more constructive work. Advocates of this
viewpoint cite the garment industry, which is very highly unionized, as
an example of the excellent conditions resulting from union or closed
shop contracts. But, conceding that an all-union shop contract makes
for peace, is that the only factor to consider in labor relations? If
the unions have something to offer to society, they should be willing
to "sell" the advantages of union membership on the theory that
anything which is really socially desirable will be supported by the
people. The union shop contract is mandatory and coercive, opposed
to our fundamental American rights and it makes the unions too power-
ful, especially since there is no external control over them in the form
of statutory regulation. Adherents of this latter viewpoint offer the
Railroad Brotherhoods and the strong British trade unions as examples
of strong, effective unions which have no all-union shop clause."0
As was the case in earlier labor negotiations, unions coming before
the War Labor Board demanded the closed or all-union shop, but this
Board has never issued a directive order granting such a demand unless
existing contracts between the parties contained provisions for such
security. Even where a union shop existed in practice, the Board
refused to grant a union shop provision for incorporation into the
agreement. The only cases in which the demand for an all-union shop
received consideration from the Board were the cases involving renewal
of an already existing all-union shop clause. 1 In view of the Presi-
dent's stand during the Captive Mines dispute, any Board sanction of
the all-union shop would be in direct contravention of the Chief Execu-
tive's announced policy. 42 The unions, during the existence of the
War Labor Board, have never taken as definite a stand as did the
coal miners in their dispute. The prevailing attitude seems to be to
ask for the extreme measure merely to leave the way open to secure
the strongest security clause the Board will give. It is no doubt true
that union leaders do not even expect to receive the closed shop by War
40 The Union Shop, FORTUNE, December, 1941, p. 5.
'112 LAB. REL. REP. 673, July 5, 1943.
'- Said President Roosevelt on November 14. 1941, "The government
of the United States will not order nor will Congress pass legislation
ordering a so-called closed shop .... The government will never compel
this 5 per cent to join the union by a government decree. That would




Labor Board decrees, and this might be the explanation for their lack
of insistence in pressing the demand. Though this Board has taken
occasion in its opinions to negative the binding nature of precedent in
its awards, the steadfast policy it has adopted against extension of
the all-union shop is only one excellent example of the inflexibility of
treatment accorded the cases before it. Of course, extenuating circum-
stances always may be ground for an exception, but generally speaking,
the disposition of union security demands is, by this time, fairly well
standardized.
Hand in hand with the policy against the extension of union or dosed
shop provisions to unions which have not had them in former contracts,
is the equally strong body of companion cases in which the Board has
barred any efforts to cut down such provisions, where they exist, to
weaker forms of union security.43 It would be inequitable, obviously,
to allow employers to use the present crisis to "get out from under"
labor agreements secured by the guaranteed right of collective bargain-
ing. In the Harvill Aircraft opinion 44 the Board for the first time took
a definite stand on the continuance of union shop clauses for the dura-
tion, stating that mutual consent should be the only ground for the
elimination of the clause. To do complete justice, special treatment
was provided for the men who were employed between the expiration
date of the agreement and the date, February 12, 1943, on which the
Board's policy was laid down. As to these employees, the standard
maintenance of membership clause with the fifteen-day escape pro-
vision was granted because "a worker shall not be compelled by the
government to join a union to get a job." Having accepted employ-
ment before the union-shop provision was renewed, such employees
would have been coerced by the government if no exception were made
in their favor. Prior to the establishment of the national Board's
policy, the regional board at New York had renewed the union and
closed shop provisions making them applicable to all employees alike.45
The stand taken by the national Board, though more complex to admin-
ister perhaps, is now the prevailing view, but whenever circumstances
are such that a modification should be made, the Board is quick to
respond to the dictates of the factual situation. Not precisely in point,
but indicative of its attitude, the Board, in the Weber Showcase
& Fixture Company 6 opinion, decreed that the union shop provision
should be strictly applied, though the company had hired hundreds of
43 Even where the union conducted a fifty-day wartime strike, union
shop provision was ordered renewed, but conditioned on making by presi-
dent of international union of report to Board regarding steps taken to fix
responsibility for strike, Brew Schneider Company, Inc., NWLB No. 562,
July 17, 1943.
"1 Earvill Aircraft Die Casting Corp., NWLB No. 163, Feb. 12, 1943.
4r12 LAB. REL. REP. 671, July 15, 1943.




non-union employees on the assumption that the provision had expired.
In upholding the former agreement, the Board stated, "It is unfortunate
that the company has hired such a large number of non-union employees
in direct violation of its contractual obligations to the union. .. . The
fact that the company may lose their services is unfortunate but not
nearly as unfortunate as the situation would be if the company were
allowed to defeat the legitimate rights of the union in the manner it has
attempted in this case."
The Philadelphia Regional Board denied continuation of a union
shop clause in one instance17 in which the union was patently non-
representative of the employees. When the company refused to dis-
charge the retail store manager who was delinquent in his payment of
union dues, a great number of the other employees immediately stopped
dues payments. By this open display of anti-union sentiment on the
part of a large percentage of the employees, the union was "character-
ized as an interloper" and not the proper bargaining agent in this
case. Since the contract was up for renewal, it was clearly within the
power of the Board to deny renewal of the union shop provision,
regardless of the normal policy in such cases, and to have done other-
wise in this instance would have worked an absurdity.
Regional boards have not found it easy to follow the mandate of the
national Board that employers, except by mutual consent of the parties,
will not be permitted to abandon a closed or union shop established
through collective bargaining. The most frequently recurring problem in
this regard has centered around the assignability or transferability of
these provisions and the regional boards, which have been confronted
with this aspect of the problem, have presented a diversity of opinion.
The national Board has not had the question before it in as clear-cut
form as might be necessary for adequate discussion, but its position can
be determined from the following statement contained in the recom-
mendations of a referee and approved by the Board:
"The efforts of the National War Labor Board are directed,
in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise, toward
the stabilization of bargaining relations as well as to the
stabilization -of wages, and changes in corporate ownership
and management would hinder these efforts appreciably if
such alterations could be made the reason for wiping out past
bargaining history entirely and for negotiating entirely new
agreements, agreements having no roots whatever in former
relationships.12
4 8
When the New York Board was confronted with a situation involving
a change of management resulting from purchase of the plant by
another company, it held that the successor company was not bound by
the closed-shop clause of the former employer's contract, despite the
fact that the original employees were retained. 49  This is not actually
1, 13 LA. REL. REP. 139, Oct. 4, 1943.
48 Safeway Trails, Inc., NWLB No. 2989-D (860), July 17, 1943.




contrary to the expression of the national Board as the substitution
of. a new company, through purchase, effects a dissolution- of the
former contract. But if there is merely a change in corporate owner-
ship, for example when one member of a joint enterprise takes over
complete management, the formal appearance of change must give
way to the substantive matter which indicates that both the employers
and the employees participated in the original agreement, the only
change being a cutting-down of the employer group.
The Boston Board 0 has adopted the converse ruling that the suc-
cessor union was legally substituted for its predecessor and as- such was
a party to the contract, so that the union shop provision could not
be eliminated without consent of the successor union. In this con-
nection, it should be pointed out that before the election was held,
both parties in this case had agreed that the winning union and the
company would abide by the contract then in force until it expired.
Without this understanding, the decision of the Boston: Board would
be hard to justify on principle. The Atlanta Board,5' on the other
hand, followed what might be termed the majority view, when it held
that nriechanics, who withdrew from the union and were recognized
as a separate bargaining unit, were not entitled to a union-shop clause
although these same employees had been covered by such a provision
before withdrawing from the original organization. Rationale for the
holding was that the bargaining relationship between 'the parties was
new and not within the ambit of protected union shop clauses.
Maintenance of Membership: Anyone at all familiar with the work
of the Labor Board has noticed that maintenance of membership is
discussed in a large portion of its cases. Since the all-union shop has
been foreclosed to all except those unions which had such a provision
in former contracts, the next best thing-membership maintenance-
has become almost a standard clause in labor agreements. Early in its
career, the Labor Board made it clear that union maintenance was not
to be granted as an automatic reaction to a demand for some sort of
union security. "It is granted only after a thorough examination of
the merits of the case and careful deliberation." The Board, before
granting such a clause, will ascertain to its satisfaction that the union
is a responsible organization capable of fulfilling its obligations and
that the maintenance provision will result in industrial harmony and
increased cooperation between management and labor.52 In short,
the Board restricted this concession to those situations which would
be materially aided by the award. By December, 1942, however,
these standards were obsolete, the Board having changed its policy.
Verbal recognition of this change was indicated in the Atlas Powder
50 d.
"'Motor Transit Company, IEG. BD. IV, No. 111-1454-D, "Aug. 5, 1943.
52 Norm-Hoffman Bearing Company, NWLB No. 120, July 18, 1942.
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Co.53 case: "Present War Labor Board policy appears to be to grant
union security. Unless some definite reason can be shown for denying
the union request, it is recommended that the Board order the standard
maintenance-of-membership clause with the fifteen-day withdrawal
period." The clause is awarded whenever a union is found to be
"democratic and responsible" when examined as to its (1) degree of
compliance with the no-strike pledge, (2) manner of conducting
election and (3) position with respect to making auditor financial
reports to members.5 4
The first recommendation of union maintenance was made in the
Mlars/all Field5 case, decided without opinion. The clause recom-
mended in this case was unusual in that it provided that the mainte-
nance of membership provisions would apply only to employees who
"individually and voluntarily certify in writing that they authorize
union dues deductions, and will, as a condition of employment, main-
tain their membership in the union in good standing during the life of
the contract." This was an early attempt to work out a satisfactory
method of administering the requirement, but apparently it was not
well accepted as it has not been resorted to in any appreciable number
of cases since the early days of the War Labor Board. A further step
taken toward the solution of the union security problem was the
granting of a union maintenance clause, with retroactive application, in
the Walker-Turner Company case." Because the company was
uncooperative and steadfastly refused to do more than the National
Labor Relations Act compelled it to do, the union was found to be
entitled to some form of security clause. The maintenance clause was
found to be a workable compromise; it required no more of the union
member than he must have contemplated when he voluntarily joined
the union and it assured to his fellow union members that he would
assume the responsibility of union membership. In this particular
instance, the Board required that all workers who were union members
as of the date of the opening of negotiations for a union shop had
to remain members in good standing for the duration of the contract.
Anyone who became a member or remained a member after the opening
of negotiations had notice of the fact that he would perhaps be
subject to a union shop agreement so that his rights were not prejudiced
by the retroactivity of the order. If one did not remain a member in
good standing, the penalty was either discharge or compulsory check-off
of dues with loss of seniority. This alternative provided the employer
the means of retaining his experienced employees even if they refused
to honor the membership maintenance clause. The clause was granted
" Atlas Powder Company, NWLB No. 521, Dec. 28, 1942.
5' Humble Oil & Refining Co., NWLB No. 111-1819-D (8-D-67), Apr. 1.
1944.55Marshall Field & Company, NWLB No. 10, Feb. 25, 1942.
"Walker-Turner Company, NWLB No. 17, April 10, 1942.
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because the union, unable to strike for higher wages, had undergone a
severe loss of membership. To give the union the protection it needed,
the Board refused to apply the Marshall Field formula, i. e., that the"
maintenance clause would apply only to members who had accepted it
in writing, because that would necessitate a recanvassing of union mem-
bers with the almost certain result that the disintegration process
would be hastened.
Voluntarism, initiated in the Marshall Field decision but not applied
in the Walker-Turner case, was given a new form and applied in the
International Harvester case17 on a collective basis. That is to say,
the choice was to be made by a referendum, with a majority vote
controlling, rather than an individual acceptance of maintenance. The
majority could bind the whole, a doctrine not unfamiliar in our national
history but much objected to by the employer members in this instance,
who thought the individuals should make their own choice. The dis-
senters indicated that they would give their approval to a maintenance
clause providing a ten-day escape clause, adopting a suggestion of
public member Wayne L. Morse. In later decisions the "escape-clause"
became a standard provision, but in the Harvester case the majority
of the Board refused to recommend it.
During the early days of June, 1942, the next advance in the mainte-
nance clause was made. Three opinions were handed down, all
providing for the clause accompanied by a fifteen-day escape provi-
sion. s In the Ranger Aircraft decision5" a maintenance clause was
granted because of the need for protection as evidenced by alleged
losses in union membership. The clause was passed by a ten to two
vote, the solid dissenting vote of employer representatives being broken
due to the inclusion of the escape provision. A second case8 0 on the
same day, contained the identical membership clause, and this decision
was passed eight to one, with two employer-members concurring and
only one dissenting. The third decision, that of the Ryan Aeronaut-
ical86 case, though dated June 18th, was the forerunner of this series
r7 International Harvester Company, NWLB Nos. NDMB 4, 4-A and 89,
Apr. 15, 1942.
18 "All employees who, 15 days after the date of the Directive Order
of the National War Labor Board in this case, are members of the Union
in good standing in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the
Union, and those employees who may thereafter become members shall,
as a condition of employment, remain members of the Union in good
standing during the life of the agreement.
"The Union shall promptly furnish to the National War Labor Board
a notarized list of members in good standing 15 days after the date of
the Directive Order. If any employee named on that list asserts that he
withdrew from membership in the Union prior to that date, the assertion
or dispute shall be adjudicated by an arbiter appointed by the National
War Labor Board whose decision shall be final and binding upon the
Union and the employee."
" Ranger Aircraft, Engine Division, NWLB No. 24, June 12, 1942.
60E-Z Mills, NWLB No. 55, June 12, 1942.
6'Ryan Aeronautical Company, NWLB No. 46, June 18, 1942.
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and the clause as drawn for the recommendation in this case became the
"standard maintenance of membership clause.16 2 The majority opinion
in the Ryan case contained a history of the maintenance clause from
the days of the Mediation Board on down to date, as a basis for under-
standing the order in the instant case, and concluded with the following
significant language:
"Finally, this maintenance of membership provides three
basic guaranties: first, it guarantees democracy in America
against the tragedy both of the disintegration of responsible
unions during the war and against the defenselessness of
industrial workers after the war; second it guarantees, through
responsible union leadership and stable union membership in
the crucial transition from war to peace, against a violent
revolution and the rise in America of a fascist, communist,
or imperialistic distatorship; and third, it affords one of our
chief hopes that the all-out production for destruction in
winning the war for freedom shall be converted into all-out
production for winning the peace and for organizing plenty for
American and for the stricken and hungry peoples still hopeful
for freedom, justice and peace all over the world."
This presents an unimpeachable aspiration, but the question arises as
to whether maintenance of membership can in fact produce the results
attributed to it. Strongly organized labor in itself can be an instrument
of dictatorship and through the maintenance clause is not sufficient
to give unwarranted power into the hands of labor leaders, the motiva-
tion to grant security in any degree apparently is the desire to achieve
strong unions as units of cooperation with industry. Quaere whether
the more realistic and more conciliatory approach would not be to
recognize that security is granted now by governmental order because
the unions, operating under no-strike pledges, are not in a position to
attain security for themselves through efficient exercise of their bar-
gaining power and that they are given protection for that reason only.
The language quoted above justifies union security on a moral plane
and seems to disregard any of the mundane factors of economic import
which actually motivate the unions in making their demands.
Roger D. Lapham, an employer member of the Board, wrote a
concurring opinion in the Ryan case in which he suggested that if by
"governmental order we are going to impose any form of employer-
employee relationship, it follows that ample protection in some way
should be accorded union members against the improper acts of
union officers, just as stockholders are protected against improper acts
of their officers and director." The two remaining employer members
dissented, one without opinion. The other, E. J. McMillan, refused to
support any order which compelled a man to remain a member, if he
was one at the expiration of the escape period, in order to continue his
employment. Said he, "No man in the present emergency should be
62 21 N. C. L. REv. surpra n. 2 at 176.
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denied by government order the right to work and thus contribute to
the success of our defense program because he does not wish to continue
membership in a union." But the dissenting opinion conceded that
the employee might be held to fulfill his financial obligation to the
union for the life of the contract.
The addition of the escape clause to the membership provision
makes the union membership entirely voluntary on the part of the
employee. Without such a period, the membership clause is very
arbitrary and forces an employee to remain a member in good
standing without giving him the opportunity to withdraw after he has
notice of the binding nature of his membership. Though a maintenance
of membership arrangement is much less than an all-union shop provi-
sion as far as the union's status is concerned, to the individual work-
man, a membership clause without an escape period is as great a
hardship as the all-union shop provision, for he is denied the right to
choose whether he shall continue in the union. An escape provision
alleviates his position to the extent that he can withdraw from the
organization until he is sure that he desires to be committed to perma-
nent membership for the duration of the contract and then he can
join the union on that basis, all without having jeopardized his right to
continued employment.
The Board, by an eight to four decision, in the Caterpillar Tractor
Company case 8 granted maintenance of membership with the fifteen-
day escape clause, with the additional direction to the company that if
it should post the order on its bulletin board it must make no comment.
Evidently this directive was an effort to prevent any company propa-
ganda to secure the resignation of union members during the escape
period. Employer member Lapham, dissenting, reiterated in more
specific fashion the suggestion he made in a former dissent that unions
given security should file with the War Labor Board statements as to
their (1) constitution and by-laws, (2) names of officers, (3) amounts
of dues and initiation fees and (4) receipts and expenditures. Public
member Morse wrote a concurring opinion answering the dissent, point-
ing out that most of the information already is secured in each case.
As for the financial matters of the unions, the information would be
irrelevant and immaterial. Moreover, he countered, fairness would
require that the same information be demanded of the opposing
employers coming before the Board. This would be equally irrelevant
material. The unions should be checked or regulated through legislation
and not-through a war emergency agency, though Morse confessed that
he believed some restrictions should be put upon them.
One of the most bitterly contested cases to come before the Board
during these early months was the Little Steel case,64 which determined
:3 Caterpillar Tractor Company, NWLB No. 63, July 4, 1942.
4 Bethlehem Steel Corp., et al, NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, July 16, 1942.
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the future policy on the two most important labor questions, the wage
issue and the union security issue. Employer members voted against
granting security but the eight to four opinion did give the usual
maintenance of membership clause with the fifteen-day escape period.
The award of union security was justified by the history of unionism in
the steel industry throughout the United States, which indicated strong
company opposition despite the fact that the United Steelworkers is one
of the most democratic and responsible unions in America. Membership
maintenance protects the liberty of persons to choose, and it affords
union and management a basis of cooperation which will lead to maxi-
mum production. This persuaded the majority to award the security
though the companies all were violently opposed to it. All of the
employer members dissented on principle, charging that the public
members granted maintenance whenever union security was de-
manded.6 5
And once again, the employer members repeated their conviction that
the unions should file financial data and certain other information
with the Board, and, in addition to their former specifications in this
line, they demanded that the unions be barred from making any
financial contribution to a political party or candidate. It is disap-
pointing to find this contention again presented to the Board as it
clearly would appear to be an effort on the part of the employers to
secure a hold over the unions which they were unable to secure through
legislation. 6 The material demanded, as was pointed out by member
Morse, has no particular place in the determination to be made. Since
the Labor Board is an agency for the settlement of labor disputes, any
matter not pertinent to the solution of the dispute under consideration
cannot properly be considered by the Board. If the demand of the
employer members were granted, particularly the demand that no
political contributions be made by the unions granted security, the
Board would take on the character of a policy agency rather than a
quasi-judicial body.
Some time previous to the "Little Steel" decision, William H. Davis,
chairman of the Board, explained at a press conference, "It is clear
that the War Labor Board majority proposes to protect the unions
against depletion of membership from circumstances arising out of
the war and that it intends at the same time to leave the men who have
not joined the union free to join or not join as they please.167  This
1S The dissent read, in part, as follows: "... the public members of the
Board have always found justification for ordering maintenance of mem-
bership. In the case before us the majority opinion is predicted on the
fact that the union is well established and responsible. Yet in the Ranger
Aircraft case the need for security by the union was based on its loss of
members ... "
"' When the dissenters first started their agitation, Congress refused to
adopt legislation curtailing union activities. With the passage of the War
Labor Disputes Act, June 12, 1943, some of the restrictions advocated by
the employers were included within the Act, but it took a labor-precipi-
tated crisis to induce Congress to pass such a bill.
67 10 LAB. RE. REP. 317, May 4. 1942.
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was before the adoption of the escape clause which the majority of the
Board opposed on the theory that it is enough that members have a
right to withdraw until the contract is promulgated and they should
need no further withdrawal period. An extension of this view is implicit
in the corollary argument that when a union seeks an all-union shop the
worker must understand that membership maintenance might be a
condition of his continued employment. The fact that he joined the
union in the first instance is indication that he has no fundamental prin-
ciples against unionism so that the security award is held not to violate
the individual's personal rights. Whatever merit the contentions may
have, the membership maintenance clause with the fifteen-day escape
provisioni, as formulated in the Little Steel case and the Ryan case, has
become the typical recommendation. Without the escape clause, main-
tenance of membership would be an unsupportable device, but the escape
clause does offer the worker an opportunity to dissolve his union affilia-
tions if he is unwilling to undertake the obligation of irrevocable mem-
bership. The war, which is the justification for union security measures,
is being waged against totalitarianism and if labor unions should win
favors which deny freedom of election to the workers, the evils against
which we are fighting abroad would be victors on the home front.
Voluntary union maintenance is in accord with the principles for which
democracies stand, but a compulsory maintenance of any private
institution, which would be the case of a maintenance clause minus
the escape provision, violates the fundamental tenants of American life.
Basis of M and M Award
A primary factor in causing the Board to grant union maintenance
in the Little Steel case was the traditional anti-union attitude of the
employers. In the face of such a feeling, the unions were at a great
disadvantage and needed outside help to maintain their strength.
Because maintenance of membership coupled with check-off of dues
(also granted in the instant case) allowed the unions to concentrate on
developing harmonious relations with the employers, the war effort was
held to be materially promoted by the grant of union security. Similar
reasoning is the basis for most of the decisions awarding security
devices. The Phelps Dodge Company6 had exhibited hostility in
the past but at the time of the labor trouble leading to the War Labor
Board hearing, the company positively asserted an intention to cooper-
ate with the union. Nevertheless, the Board granted maintenance of
membership because it doubted that the good-faith intention to
cooperate "is itself enough to remove the existing fears among the
unions that there may be a recurrence of anti-labor activity." It
is certain that the members of the Board were realistic in realizing
that the union would be somewhat distrustful of the promise inasmuch
as anti-union antagonism was so firmly a part of Phelps Dodge manage-
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meat policy. But it is questionable whether a maintenance award,
under the circumstances, was justifiable. The Board was so solicitous
of labor union response that it failed to give an opportunity to the
company to work out the situation with its employees. If the company
expressed a good-faith intention to accept union representatives,
and the Board found that it so did, more stable labor relations would
be fostered by company-union cooperation without the intervention of
the governmental agency. A union which is overly distrustful of an
employer is guilty of fostering an anti-union spirit by denying to the
employer a right to reform. The use of membership maintenance
clauses in such instances might well produce such a reactionary
feeling in the employer group as to prevent the amicable adjustment
of relations in the post-war era.
In contrast, the maintenance clause has a vital part to play where
the employer is openly antagonistic to unionization. The maintenance
provision was recommended in the S. A. Woods case"" because the
employer definitely leaned toward hiring non-union men and made
derogatory remarks about union activities which led to a loss in
union membership. In view of war-time regulations and the no-strike
pledge, the unions should not have the additional handicap of open
employer opposition. The union was found to be responsible and
democratic, meeting the standards informally established for security
grants. Obviously, the anti-union conduct of an employer is a deterrent
to union affiliation and when the unions are prevented from carrying
on activities to make membership attractive, their chances of survival
in the area of antagonism are but slight. Fear and mistrust of manage-
ment can be alleviated by the appropriate security clause, to the end
that better labor relations will be established in the interest of
uninterrupted production.7" Following through with this principle,
the Board grants maintenance of membership to unions located in
notoriously anti-union areas or in industries antagonistic to unioniza-
tion."'
A somewhat different problem is presented by the factual situation
found in the case of the United States Rubber Company,72 wherein
maintenance was found to be acceptable to the company for it had
such agreements in other plants. This fact negatived the possibility of
increased employer-employee friction resulting from such an award.
18 Phelps Dodge Co., supra n. 63.
69 S. A. Woods Machine Company, NWLB No. 160, August 1, 1942. Em-
ployer refusal to accept the recommendation further indicates the depth
of its hostility.1 0Borg-Warner Corp, NWLB No. 135, August 1, 1942.
71 Consolidated Steel Corp., NWLB No. 43, August 6, 1942. See also
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., NWLB No. 59, July 31, 1942 (m of m granted
because of race prejudice and need to give prestige to union with negro
membership).
72U. S. Rubber Co., NWLB No. 180, July 23, 1942. Another example is
Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, NWLB No. 141, August 3, 1942.
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Security was granted because the union was faced with serious diffi-
culties growing out of the number of new, non-union minded workers
in the industry whose presence impaired union morale. Moreover,
the union felt that unrest would be created among its members when
they learned that the general wage increase question would not be
settled immediately. These circumstances dearly called for mainte-
nance. of membership. Indeed, this particular type of situation is the
one which is implicit in all generalizations offered to defend or justify
membership maintenance; i. e., that the device will preserve the union's
security from effects of conversion of industry and will thus enable the
union to more effectively cooperate with the employer in solving war-
time production problems.
Yet another basis for awarding maintenance of membership is
exemplified in the Coos Bay Logging Company7 3 situation. The
companies, opposed to any form of union security, were located in an
area in which over 100 other lumber companies had such a formula
by reason of a NDMB recommendation of May, 1941, which affected
70 per cent of the operations in which the 'union had contracts.
Therefore, maintenance was awarded here. Precedent for this basis was
to be found in the Bethlehem Steel case wherein the NDMB founded
its decision on the fact that similar operations in the area had the
provision which the Steel Company opposed. It stands to reason that
industrial stabilization in one particular area is dependent upon
equality or similarity of labor treatment in all the operations. The
clause as directed for the Coos Bay Logging Company, did not
conform to the standard clause established in the Ryan case and
used consistently to date, but it was unqualified-without an escape
provision-and further provided that the employer, so far as consistent
with law, "agrees to recommend that all new employees . . . who are
found, satisfactory to the employer after a probationary period of
forty (40) days' work join the union recognized as the sole collective
bargaining agency." Already existing contracts in the area were ample
justification for the stringency of this clause, though normally it should
not be incumbent upon an employer to recommend union membership,
because it is just as prejudicial to democratic practices to have an
employer recommending membership as it is to have him openly
antagonistic. Under ideal circumstances, the employer should be
neutral as the burden is upon the union to sell itself to the workers
and the election of membership belongs to the worker himself. Labor
relations necessitate employer recognition and acceptance of unionism,
but essentially the organizational phases of unionism are not within
the employer's province.
Little question arises where both parties agree in advance to a
maintenance award. In such cases, the Board performs merely the
73 Coos Bay Logging Co., NWLB Nos. 155, 156, 157, August 6, 1942.
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formality of sanctioning the clause and giving it official backing.'4
Maintenance of membership is granted frequently as a substitute
for an all-union shop where it is not feasible or desirable to grant the
stronger form of security. For example, the Gen-E-Motor Company
had entered into a closed shop agreement with the AFL union, but
when the CIO local won at the next election, the company refused
to grant the new union an all-union shop and went so far as to oppose
any form of security. The Board ordered incorporation of the
maintenance clause, qualified by the fifteen-day escape provision,
denying effectiveness to the company's opposition to all security
because it had operated three years under the AFL contract in which
it had voluntarily granted the closed shop and now it could not
consistently oppose union security merely on principle." Conceding
that the company's contentions contain no merit, the case is one in
which maintenance was granted for no persuasive reason and so may
be taken as an indication that security is granted as a rule and
denial is the exception, which the Board has since announced to be its
policy.' Of course, the fact that union-employer contractual relations
had existed for some time derogates somewhat from the significance
of this decision, but the Board referred to the former agreement as
evidence that the company was not fundamentally opposed to unionism
and did not rely on it as an indication of the necessity to grant
security. The growing collection of maintenance recommendations
establishes a rebuttable presumption that maintenance of member-
ship will result in increased production and will produce harmony in
labor relations. This so-called presumption places the burden on the
employer to prove that maintenance of membership will not meet the
standards set up in the Nomna-Hoffman case. Just what degree of
evidence is sufficient to overcome the putative presumption is not clear
from the opinions but it is clear that a showing of present harmonious
relations is not enough, though one may wonder what maintenance of
membership will do for production in plants where no disharmony
exists. Answer might well be made that the agitation for union
security is evidence in itself of a lack of harmony so that lack of open
hostility is not a conclusive showing of cooperation. But the demand
for union security is not properly used in such an argument inasmuch
as union leaders and organizers make demands just to get whatever
they can. A demand for union security may be no reflection whatsoever
of employer-employee relations within the plant because in a large
number of cases the demand is inspired by a desire to have as favor-
able a contract as the other unions. After the Board became more
lenient in granting maintenance clauses, many unions felt compelled
7 4 Bemis Bag Co., NWVLB No. 262, August 15, 1942.




to have a security clause in order to maintain their prestige among
the other unions. Thus, demands for security are not necessarily an
expression of hostile employer-employee relations, but such demands
are also indicative of a pressure forcing one union to gain whatever
benefits the other unions have. In this respect, governmental policy
perhaps aggravated union activity during the early days of the war.
The foregoing discussion has been predicated upon opinions of the
Board during the early months of its life and immediately following
the introduction of the standard maintenance clause which proved so
workable a compromise as to secure the award of membership mainte-
nance in a great number of cases. A brief survey of the justification
for union maintenance, offered in subsequent cases, will serve to indi-
cate the wide applicability of this clause.
Anti-union conduct or attitude of the management has been already
mentioned as a basis. If maintenance of membership has any validity,
it is applicable in such instances without any question. The major
point of disagreement is not whether it should be granted if employer
hostility is present but lies in the amount and conclusiveness of evi-
dence offered to prove hostility.7 7 Closely allied with the hostility
cases are those in which the maintenance award has been predicated
upon distrust of the management as such feeling of distrust stems from
conduct which borders on hostility. A history of past difficulty with
the management is frequently the basis of distrust, but the opinions are
not always worded in terms of distrust when maintenance is granted
because of past conduct. 79 Or, looking at the union's position, mainte-
77M of m granted because of anti-union attitude of employer: Towne
Robinson Nut Co., NWLB No. 270, September 2, 1942 (employer refused
to accept union as medium through which to carry on industrial relations);
American Can Company, NWLB No. NDMB 102, September 2, 1942 (anti-
union attitude and lack of good faith in dealing with union representa-
tives); Shell Oil Co., NWLB No. 92, September 23, 1942 (company shown
to be hostile by decision of Circuit Court enforcing unfair labor practice
order); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., NWLB No. 51, October 31, 1942 (long
period of unsuccessful negotiation); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., NWLB
No. 192, October 19, 1942 (company consistently refused to recognize right
of employees to bargain through representatives); Bendix Aviation Corp.,
Marine Division, NWLB No. AR-95, January 9, 1943 (company demon-
'strated hostility toward unions in general); Eclipse Fuel Engineering
Company, NWLB No. 416, January 26, 1943; Moltrup Steel Company,
NWLB No. Wa-267, February 2, 1943 (company's attitude so hostile as to
provoke strike); Foote Brothers Gear & Machine Corp., NWLB No. 2905-D(788), July 17, 1943; Wilson Athletic Goods. Manufacturing Company,
WNLB No. 4203-D, August 11, 1943 (unilateral wage increase undermined
union).
78 In the following cases m of m was granted to overcome the distrust
which prevented harmonious interaction of employers and employees;
United Shoe Machinery Company, NWLB No. 304, Oct. 3, 1942 (company
executed individual contracts, delayed bargaining); Underwood Elliott
Fisher Company, NWLB No. 178, October 2, 1942; Borg-Warner Corp.,
NWLB No. 4246-D, August 18, 1943.
70 See Standard Tool Company, NWLB No. 202, October 2, 1942 (com-
pany refused to recognize right of union to bargain); Libby, McNeill &
Libby, NWLB No. 386, November 16, 1942 (excessive number of grievances
and trouble with management); Burington Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc.,
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nance has been granted as a reward for the union's waiver of peace-
time rights80 and to promote the solution of complex organizational
problems created by conversion of plants and migration of labor due
to defense production demands.8 The remaining major basis for the
grant might be termed the area of applied psychology because the
Board has justified many of its decisions on the ground that they
will promote union-employer cooperation, 82 stabilize the unions posi-
tion," strengthen union discipline,8 4 promote production through
harmony86 and produce responsible union leadership.86 In addition
NWLB No. 300, December 31, 1942 (no collective bargaining as parties
were unable to agree due to misunderstandings and delays); Swift & Co.,
et al, NWLB No. 187, February 8, 1943 ("sudden and violent eruptions" in
former bargaining relations); Leviton Manufacturing Co., NWLB No. 507,
March 10, 1943; Horseburgh & Scott Co., NWLB No. 606, March 17, 1943;
Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Company, NWLB No. 439, March 17,
1943 (company had attempted to break union through formation of com-
pany dominated union); LaCross Rubber Mills Company, NWLB No. 433,
March 30, 1943; Texas Company, NWLB No. 571, April 3, 1943 (even though
present relations are amicable); Quaker Oats Company, NWLB No. 2972-D,
April 13, 1943; Moench Tanning Co., Inc., NWLB No. 277, April 21, 1943;
Ramsdell Tool & Manufacturing Co., Inc., NWLB No. 3052 (923), July 30,
1943.
"oMack Manufacturing Corp., NWLB No. 76, September 4, 1942 ("there
is a public responsibility to enable unions to do what is expected of them
to assure them that the new program does not require .their self-destruc-
tion"); Celanese Corp. of America, NWLB No. 539, March 24, 1943 ("here-
tofore an important inducement to union membership has been the pros-
pect of wage increases . . . the national stabilization program has caused
wage adjustments to be increasingly difficult of attainment. In conse-
quence there is today greater justification for safeguard union security");
United States Gypsum Co., NWLB No. 761, June 24, 1943 ("in of m shall
be granted a union in return for its no-strike agreement .. "); Ken-
Rad Tube & Lamp Corp., NWLB No. 2942-D (815), July 22, 1943 ("the
union is not now in a sufficiently well-established position in the plants
of the company to give it security in the absence of the power to strike");
Bell Aircraft Corp., NWLB No. 111-131-C, July 30, 1943.8 1 B. F. Goodrich Company, et at., NWLB Nos. 184 and 190, September
17, 1942; Niles-Belmont-Pond Company, NWLB No. 340, January 2, 1943;
Harshaw Chemical Company, NWLB No. 590, March 17, 1943 ("a definite
union fear of membership loss based nearly entirely on the flow of mem-
bers from industry to industry because of abnormal war-time circum-
stances"); Pepperell Manufacturing Co., NWLB No. 683, March 23, 1943;
Remington Rand, Inc., NWLB No. 424, March 26, 1943 ("war expansions
and contractions in employment constitute an unstabilizing factor which
needs to be counterbalanced in the interests of production, morale and
the union's already established status"); World Bestos Brake Lining Corp.,
NWLB No. 235, March 27, 1943; Johns-Manville Corp., NWLB No. 457,
May 7, 1943; Empire Findings Co., Inc., NWLB No. 622, May 8, 1943; Kelly
Springfield Engineering Company, et al, NWLB No. 111-453-D, August 26,
1943; Swift & Company Refinery, NWLB No. 3024-D (985) August 18, 1943.
8_Monolith Portland Cement Company, NWLB Nos. 244 and 231, Sep-
tember 19, 1942; Wilson-Jones Company, NWLB No. 161, September 25,
1942; Feltex Corporation, Fiber Container Division, NWLB No. 430, Octo-
ber 9, 1942.
83 Phelps Dodge Corp., NWLB Nos 5 and 114, June 24, 1942 ("we should
in proper cases seek to stabilize the positions they have established against
further inroads"); J. H. Williams and Company, NWLB No. 225, Septem-
ber 18, 1942; Non-Ferrous Metal Companies, NWLB Nos. 185, 218, 228,
237, 275, 276, 341, 344, 345, 346, 347, 390, 393, October 23, 1942.
81 Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing Company, NWLB No. 383,
December 14. 1942, ("union-maintenance clause would strengthen union
discipline and promote better industrial relations in the plant").
5 Mack Manufacturing Corporation, NWLB No. 76, September 4, 1942:
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to the foregoing generalizations which would permit the award in
almost any instance, the Board has relied upon more specific justifica-
tions where the facts warranted, as examples of which be listed the
security policy of the parent company, 7 the risk of losing white
members through employment of negroes,8 s or disrupting inter-union
rivalry. 9
(To Be Continued)
North American Refractories Company, NWLB Nos. 266-A, 266-B, and
266-C, September 23, 1942; General Motors Corporation, NWLB Nos. 125
and 128, September 26, 1942 ("in order to secure the increased production
which will result from greater harmony"); Smith & Wesson, Inc., NWLB
No. 368, November 16, 1942; Cincinnati Industries, Inc., NWLB No. 519,
October 26, 1942. The phrase "in order to secure the increased produc-
tion which will result, etc." was incorporated in a good many of the
directive orders.
8 6Ralston-Purina Company, NWLB No. 503, October 24, 1942.
8 American Bridge Company, et al., NWLB Nos. Ar-121, Ar-150,
Ar-151, Ar-152, Ar-154, Ar-155, January 13, 1943.
68 Swift & Company, et al, NWLB No. 187, February 8, 1943.
"' Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, NWLB No. 465, October
16, 1942; Sullivan Drydock & Repair Company, NWLB No. 565, February
13, 1943.
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